Mark Riebling sends in the following dispatch:

Two new counter-terrorism controversies, in London and Paris, underscore the covalence of domestic security and immigration/border control. Both cases involve background checks for transport employees. Each raises questions that American localities must confront, but which policy analysts have been slow to address.

In London, Mohmmad Mostafa was fired from his job on the subway when it was learned that he was jailed in Yemen in 1999 for plotting to kill Western tourists. Mostafa and his father were central figures at the infamous Finsbury Park mosque; his father is serving seven years for inciting murder and preaching racial hatred during sermons there. Mostafa had previously attempted to forge a career in rap, with lyrics describing waging holy war and dying for Allah. His job gave him access to the labyrinth of tunnels in the Westminster, where the Tube runs virtually under Parliament.

The incident has provoked an outcry from Britons, who have asked, first how Mostafa could have possibly passed a background check, and, second, what he was doing in the country at all. At least three subordinate questions merit attention by those concerned with U.S. security:

1. How do we assess the veracity of convictions from countries, such as Yemen, which have weak legal systems and poor human-rights records, or which operate under Sharia (Islamic law)?

2. Is it proper to disqualify persons from employment in sensitive sectors because of their familial relations? Or do we take the position that "no one can be blamed for what their parents do”?

3. How does the use of private contractors complicate the process of background checks? A London Underground spokesman said it was up to the private contractor, and not the Underground, to make criminal checks. Is it feasible for private corporations to consult with foreign governments, to verify the criminal backgrounds of all its immigrant employees in sensitive sectors? Even if it is feasible, who is accountable? Who checks the checkers?

A similar set of questions emerges from events in Paris, where French authorities stripped 72 Muslim workers of their security clearances at Charles de Gaulle Airport. The workers lost their access badges because they had traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan, because they were “suspected of having links to extremists,” or because they rejected “France and our values.”

The Paris case, like the London incident, raises the question of what types of personal associations are tolerable among transport workers. One airport employee was allegedly “a friend” of would be shoe-bomber Richard Reid. Another blackballed man was reputedly “close to” a senior figure in the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

The propsect of guilt-by-association hangs especially heavily over Muslims in France’s manual-labor market. Because guildlike unions make hiring and firing nearly impossible, accusing someone of ties to terrorists may be one of the few ways of getting him to actually leave his job – or, perhaps more to the point, of opening up a slot for a new employee. Unions estimate that at least a fifth of the airport’s 83,000 employees are Muslim. If so, then that is perhaps 16,000 job slots that might be prised open through conniving, jockeying, and whispering campaigns.

In both the Paris and London cases, however, localities and corporations are bearing burdens that really ought to be carried by the national government. We sholdl not leave it to a Human Resources clerk at the Transportation Security Administraiton, or at the MTA or one of its private contractors, to decide what “true Islam” is, or what type of "ties "are “suspicious,” or what tastes in rap music disquqalify an applicant for sensitive work. The proper place to address all of these pesonal-background questions is at the border -- or, better yet, abroad, at the place and time of application for entry.

Yet, comparatively little attention has been given to this issue. In their 483-page textbook on Homeland Security, James Carafano and Mark Sauer devote only two paragraphs to border control.

In Hard Won Lessons: Transit Security, the Manhattan Institute’s Charles Sahm notes: “Given their new role in the post-9/11 world, the selection of transit employees becomes even more important. Criteria for background investigations should be established, and thorough background checks should be conducted on all new frontline operations and maintenance employees.” Yet, Sahm does not say what the criteria for these investigations should be, or who should conduct the background checks.

Should we deny someone a job on the subway system, or at an airport, because someone deems him “against America and its values?” If so, that still begs the question, not only of who that someone should be, but of what is America, and, crucially, what are our values?

In other words: The War on Terrorism is, ultimately, a humanities problem. Until it is seen in that light, the underlying issue in the London and Paris cases – the proper relationship between legal immigration and domestic security -- will remain a problem in search of a policy.